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-
The possibility of achieving cartel success with internal enforcement
devices is explored by examining the behavior of railroad cartels in the years
just before the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the passage
of the Sherman Act. The collusion is found to have been relatively stable,
periods of breakdown being determined by reduction in the demand for rail
freight service. Econometric work confirms that the probability of cartel
adherence varied derectly with the volume of flour and grain shipped and with
other important structural variables.

Although there have been extensive studies of the history of certain
cartels, almost all of which seem to exhibit a pattern of intermittent
success and failure at maintaining joint-profit-maximizing prices and
output, there has not yet been an empirical test of hypotheses regarding
the causes for this pattern. The research reported here seeks to offer
such a test for the case of railroad cartels operating between the
Midwest and the Atlantic coast in the late nineteenth century in the
years just before the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. This subject is particularly well-suited for the sorts of studies
cartel theory has long urged: neither regulatory nor statute constraint
interfered with the operations of the railroad cartels. That is, the
colluders had neither the protection often associated with a regulatory
agency nor the fear of discovery by private or public enforcers of the
antitrust laws. Under these circumstances, it will be seen, the prin-
ciple determinant of whether the collusion worked or not was the pattern
of fluctuation in the demand for the cartel's output.
Section I offers a brief description of the method of internal en-
forcement of cartel rules which the railroads developed. Section II
presents tabular evidence relating cartel fortunes to the business cycle.
Section III describes the data which have been collected, the theoretical
model which will be tested, and the results of the empirical tests. Sec-
tion IV summarizes the findings of the research and offers conclusions.
I.
Collusive agreements figured in nearly all inter-city and passenger
traffic at one time or another." Among the most significant of these
cartels were the Iowa Pool, a combination among the roads running between
3
Council bluffs and Chicago; the Southern Railway and Steamship Associa-
tion, which included all major lines south of the Ohio and east of the
4
Mississippi Rivers, as well as the competing river and coastwise steamers;
and the Joint Executive Committee, a rate-setting and market-share enforc-
ing group of trunk line and connecting roads between the Midwest and
the eastern seaboard ports north of Baltimore.
Following the successful example, after 1875, of the Southern Rail-
way and Steamship Association, the trunk line roads leading west from
the Atlantic seaboard agreed in 1876 to quote the same rates and to
divide all westbound dead freight from the coast in fixed proportions
calculated from average market shares over the past four years. After
several breakdowns, the trunk lines and their western connections
formalized an agreement in April, 1879, to divide eastbound tonnage
from the common point of Chicago. The new organization was called the
Joint Executive Committee, and Colonel Albert Fink became its commis-
5
sioner.
Meanwhile, roads leading east from Peoria, St. Louis, Decatur,
Indianapolis, Louisville, Cincinnati, et al. , undertook pooling arrange-
ments of their own. Each of these pools was represented on the Joint
Executive Committee and attempted to set its rules and rates consistently
with those in other parts of the cartel. For example, the tariff of
rates quoted by each of the pools was calculated on the basis of the
Chicago-New York rate for grain in one hundred pound lots.
Three classes of commodities were pooled in the commercial centers
whence a cartel operated. Each class had its own administrative body
and allotted market shares to members. Dead freight included all tons
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shipped of flour, grain (wheat, corn, oats, rye, and barley), and pro-
visions (beef, pork, cured meats, lard, and canned meats). There was
a pool on livestock from June, 1879, and from June, 1880, pooling of
both east- and west-bound passenger traffic. In addition, from October,
1880, the New York Central, Erie, and Pennsylvania attempted a separate
Immigrant pool.
This proliferation of merchandise covered by collusive agreements
created another source of possible instability in any one of the arrange-
ments. The roads which ran from Chicago to the seaboard may be taken
as a case in point. Suppose that conditions were such that those roads
were, ceteris paribus
,
inclined to adhere to the same supra-competitive
rates and to their assigned market shares. If we now relax the cet. par.
assumption, it is clear that the interdependence of the eastbound trans-
port network and of the various separate pooling arrangements on dif-
ferent commodities might cause troubles in the otherwise stable Chicago
pool. The effect of some exogenous dislocation in a competing center,
say, St. Louis, would, because of the method of setting rates in
St. Louis on the basis of the Chicago-New York rate, cause disequil-
ibrium between the Chicago and St. Louis markets. Worse still, within
the Chicago pool a dispute regarding the livestock pool might cause a
spillover disruption in the dead freight pool. And again, a fight in
the westbound market among the trunk lines might occasion instructions
to the western connections to take up the battle on the eastbound busi-
ness as well, through refusing to transfer tonnage in settlement of
accounts with the rivalrous western connections of the warring trunk
lines.
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This is a formidable list of things that might go wrong. If it
were also true that there were no effective internal policing devices
in each of the separate cartels nor any effective policing mechanism
by the Joint Executive Committee to stop local disruptions from spread-
ing, we should be comfortable with a prediction for the quick demise
of the cartel.
The colluders were not, however, blind to the temptation to violate
the agreement. The JEC had five means of reducing the incentive to
cheat on the cartel contract. The first was the compilation and publ-
ication of statistics on tonnage movements by members. These figures
had been verified by the station agents, who were not employees either
of the roads or of the cartel. Those figures were then verified by
minions of the powerful Chicago Board of Trade. Subsequently the Board
instituted a Weighing Association, which further verified the correct
billing by weight of packaged shipments from each road's terminal.
Once the statistics began being gathered at the point of origin, they
quickly found their way into print. The Chicago Tribune and Railway
Review
,
listed the weekly shipments as well as a summary of the pool's
activities in the preceeding seven days. The wide availability of
these presumably accurate tables—only once did a member question their
g
accuracy —must have greatly reduced the incentive to cheat since dis-
covery was so very certain.
The second device used by the Joint Executive Committee was a
hired Board of Arbitrators to settle disputes among members. Typically
the complaint raised was about the size of allotment. In a few instances
the complainant disrupted the cartel through rate-slashing so as to make
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the strength of its dissatisfaction known. More frequently, the
member was content to leave the decision to the arbitrators. Never in
the history of the JEC were share revisions the cause of a rate war.
In large part this is probably attributable to the presence of distin-
guished names on the board, men hired from outside the immediate area
and community but with a national reputation for expertise in railroad
affairs.
A third device was used from March 11, 1881: the assignment to the
commissioner of the power to match any price cut discovered on the floor
of the Board of Trade in Chicago. Although Orr and MacAvoy have correctly
shown that this device should not necessarily compel the cheater to aban-
don his disruption, the practice did have its periods of effectiveness,
though by and large it must be admitted to have been a weak tool.
Fourthly, various economic sanctions were imposed on cheaters. From
March, 1882, there is mention in the Railway Review of the handing- in of
good faith deposits by the members to the commissioner, a device used
from its beginning by the Southern Railway and Steamship Association.
Clearly the deposit of a substantial sum of money which would be for-
feited in whole or in part upon a proven accusation of cheating would
be a strong incentive to calculate very carefully before disrupting the
cartel. A second form of economic sanction was the refusal to transfer
freight with a road known to be cheating. This usually applied not to
the western connections of the trunk lines themselves but to the smaller
local roads which had no direct access to seaboard markets.
Between June, 1879, and January, 1887, the positive inducement to
remain loyal to the Chicago peel lay in the repeated attempts to equalize
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equal and allotted shipments of the dead freight carried east. Before
1882 the joint agent of the JEC used the weekly statistics of the cartel
to issue instructions to freight forwarders as to where to direct freight.
The freight agents of a road "over" were asked to send custom to either
the joint agent's office or the freight agent of a read "under." This
was much to ask of an assiduous employee interested in his own commission.
Therefore, independent agents of the cartel stationed at members' ter-
minals saw to the redirection of traffic themselves from an early date in
the collusion's history. As court rulings began to find illegal this
taking from the shipper the right to name his route without the shipper's
12
prior consent, the joint agent began to offer discounts to large
shippers assigning the joint agent the right to get the goods to their
destination by whatever route he saw fit. The shipper was advised of
13
the route selected and was asked to pay that particular road.
II.
The pattern of cartel stability and instability between 1880 and
1886 was not random, but rather cartel success and failure seem to follow
the business cycle. Evidence that this is an accurate summary of events
in the Chicago cartel for the period 1873 to 1893 is presented in the
following tables and figures. Table 1 presents the annual figures on
the shipments of flour and grain from the city and on the revenues real-
ized from the transport of all freight by thirteen roads which served
Chicago. Seven of the roads were in the east and members of the Joint
Executive Committee; the remaining six were tributary to Chicago and
members of the Iowa Pool. In the last two columns of the table the
annual rates of change for the two series are compared. Revenues are,
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for the purposes at hand, to be taken as a proxy for the earnings of
the roads in question. In that the tonnage series and the revenue
series cover slightly different markets, the correlation between the
two will be imperfect. Nonetheless, it can be seen that there is
enough of a relationship to warrant the inferences developed below.
Lastly, the Chicago cartel colluded on all dead freight, not just on
flour and grain. However, those two commodities made up, on average,
more than 8C% of all cartelized output so that flour and grain ship-
ments nay be taken as a reasonable proxy for the market demand for
14
eastbound transportation services.
The table seems to indicate, first, that there was a cyclical pat-
tern to the volume of flour and grain shipments leaving Chicago between
1873 and 1896. In the early 1870's that volume fell for several years,
and then revived in 18 76 for a stretch of five years, through to the
end of 1880. The period 1881 through 1886 was one of nearly continuous
decline in the volume of shipments, 1883 standing out by comparison.
Then began a long period of continuous, strong improvement in the trans-
port of grain and flour, an improvement which continued for six years.
There was a drop in 1893 and 1894, and then a renewal of the increase.
It can be seen by reference to Figure 1 that this pattern of grain ship-
ment from Chicago corresponds roughly to the cyclical pattern of national
income growth through this period, as determined by the National Bureau
reference cycle chronology given along the horizontal axis on the figure
and more explicitly in the notes accompanying the figure.
In Table 2 the annual change series from the first table is repro-
duced and compared to the total number of miles of railroad built in
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each year from 1873 to 1896 and, for the 1880's, with an index of ad-
herence to the Chicago East-Bound Dead Freight Pool's tariff of rates
and an index of the average rate on grain transport from Chicago to
New York. The adherence index is the percentage of the weeks in the
calendar year during which there was no discounting from the official
rate reported in any of the following four sources: Railway Review
,
Chicago Tribune , Bradstreet 's , and Railroad Gazette . The more com-
plete the adherence to the collusion, the closer the index is to 1.
The index on grain rates for the 1380 's was developed from the same
sources and has been weighted by the number of weeks in the calendar
year during which each particular observation was reported. A compar-
ison with the official rates reported in the Annual Report of the
Chicago Board of Trade for each year in the period reveals that the
actual and the official rates frequently were not equal. Since the
same sources which were used for the rate index for 1380-1886 were not
available for either 1873-1879 or for 1387-1896, that index series
could not be developed for the entire period.
To complement the material contained in Table 2, the number of
miles of rail built each year and the amount of grain and flour shipped
from Chicago each year are graphed for the years 1873-1896 in Figure 1.
Again the cautionary note must be appended that the miles-constructed
series is not strictly for the same market as covered by the shipment
series. The construction series from Foor's Manuals covers the entire
United States, not just the area in which the Joint Executive Committee
operated. We may assume that construction of railroad miles in the
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cartel territory between Chicago and the Atlantic coast and tributary
to Chicago from the west moved with the national figures.
The first conclusion to be derived from Table 2 is that for the
early 1880 ' s the grain rate moved in the same direction as did the index
of cartel adherence. The stronger the collusion the higher was the
charge for hauling grain from Chicago to New York. It also appears to
be the case that railroad construction followed changes in flour and
grain shipments fairly closely but with glaring exceptions: in the
years just after 1880 and in the early 1890' s. In the 1870' s the rela-
tionship between flour and grain shipments and miles of rail laid was
direct and very close.
From Column 4 in Table 2 and from the summary of cartel affairs
at the end of section I, we know that in two of those periods the cartel
operating in trunk line territory had difficulty. In the early 1880'
s
it appears to have been the case that the number of miles of rail con-
structed was increasing extremely rapidly at the same time that shipments
from Chicago were declining precipitously. When those shipments rose
again in 1882 and 1883, the cartel's fortunes improved. But the down-
turn in freight in the following year caused two consecutive years of
difficulty in the collusion as the dwindling amount of business had to
be passed out among the greatly increased number of roads in the market
for transportation to the east.
III.
A continuous 328-week series of binary data on adherence and non-
adherence in the Chicago Eastbound Dead Freight Pool has been compiled
from the Railway Review
,
the Chicago Tribune , the Railway Age , and
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Bradstreet 's . The period covered is January 1, 1880, through April 18,
1886. Over the 328 weeks examined these four sources gave contradictory
evidence on the state of the cartel fewer than ten times. In each of
those instances, any report of non-adherence was accepted. Are there
any systematic biases in the data? That is, is there any reason to be-
lieve there is either a systematic undercount or overcount of the number
of weeks of non-adherence?
It would seem to be reasonable to guess that too much adherence
has been counted. The argument would be that cheating is by its very
nature a secret affair. It is only nonrandomly discovered when it
reaches epidemic proportions. Therefore, all the secret deals struck
week by week with individual shippers by the various cartel members
have not been captured in the dichotomous dependent variable.
As against this one might maintain that the incidents of non-
adherence may be overreported because each shipper had an incentive to
whisper the untruth that he was the beneficiary of a discount from
read X, in hope that this false report would spark a rate war. Thus,
many weeks reported as containing nonadherence on the strength of
rumors of cheating were in fact weeks of complete adherence. Bring-
ing these two arguments together, one might claim that these two biases
offset each other so that the expected value cf the error term is truly
zero. There are other reasons for trusting the data or at least for
believing there are no serious biases affecting the results.
Given the manner in which the floor of the Chicago 5oard of Trade
operated and the incentives en ail sides to discover what was really
afoot, the great hustle and bustle of the commodity exchange when flour
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and grain shipments were booming could not help but increase the prob-
ability of detecting a discount. Conversely, when business was poor,
there were fewer traders on the floor, and less incentive on the part
of a shipper to disclose a discount, despite the increased incentive
to discount on the part of any member of the cartel. Thus, a rate cut
was more likely to have been unearthed in good times and less likely,
in bad times. The four sources from which the dichotomous adherence
series was derived would have been more likely, therefore, to report
non-adherence when through shipments of dead freight from Chicago were
booming and less likely to report non-adherence when shipments were
very slow. If this is true, then by recording the dependent variable
on the basis of those reports the case has been prejudiced against
finding a direct relationship between variations in the demand for
transport services and in cartel stability.
This last point can be put more formally. Assume that the weekly
data on adherence or non-adherence has been generated by a process in-
volving many separate decisions as to what price to charge. For ex-
ample, rates could have been set with a certain amount of discretion
by individual roads' freight agents. For each of these contracts
written by the agents there is a probability of adherence to the offi-
cial rate. Define these probabilities over j contracts as 9; and assume
them confined tc the interval [0, 1]. Assume that they follow a beta
distribution with oarameters a and b such that
(1
>
e
,
" iffemfr
9a" 1
< 1
-
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1
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«
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.
J J
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The mean probability of adherence over all the freight contracts written
is then
C2) E(8 4 ) =j a + b
One may now argue that the binary observations which have been
gathered for 1880-1886 have come from observations on the "representa-
tive" or "mean" contract. A will have been assigned to the period
if the mean contract was made at the cartel rate and 1 otherwise. The
journalists who reported adherence or non-adherence may have in fact
had bellwether contracts of a mean size which they attempted to monitor
so as to be aware of the state of the cartel. In view of these consider-
ations the binary variables on reported adherence may be used to estimate
E(9.).
Further assume that the parameters of the beta distribution, a and
b, are functions of independent variables which indicate conditions in
the eastbound market from Chicago, the state of the cartel in the last
time interval, the difference between allotted and actual shares for
deficit roads, and so on. Define x' as the vector of these variables
for a given period and assume that the parameters of the beta distribu-
tion follow the functional forms
(3) a = exp(ax')
(4) b = exp(3x')
.
We may then write the mean probability of adherence as
exp (ax
'
)
(5) E(e) =
exp (ax') + exp(2x')
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Manipulation then gives the logistic function,
Em = exp[-(p - q)y.']hte;
1 + exp[-(g - a)x«]
(6) E(S) = {1 + exp[-(g - a)x']}~ 1
Non-linear estimation techniques can then be used to identify (B - a).
In this formulation it will prove impossible to estimate a and B sepa-
rately, and so a and b cannot be predicted. The strength of this for-
mulation is that it demonstrates explicitly how the probability of
adhering to the representative contract is related to the binary obser-
vations, and that the probability of adherence changes as cartel con-
ditions change.
Within the time period dictated by the tonnage figures, it was
possible to gather data on other variables bearing on the eastbound car-
tel. One of these variables was each road's allotment under the various
cartel contracts. Whenever the contract was revised cr altered by an
arbitrator's ruling, the new allotments were published in the Railwav
Review
,
the Railway Age , and the Tribune . Specific starting dates for
reckoning shares were also announced with each new assignment. Between
January 1, 138C, and April 18, 1886, there were six revisions in the
percentages for dead freight. Using these and the previously described
tonnage figures, it was possible to calculate deviations between actual
and allotted tons for each week in the sample period. These form the
basis for variables X
1
through X, and XQ in Table 3.
The Chicago Board of Trade's Annual Reports for the period 1880-
1886 also gave the dates on which the navigation season opened and
closed. These were gathered in order to test, through the use of
-14-
duimny variables, whether the presence of competition on the lakes in-
fluenced the probability of cartel success. Whether competition
really prevailed between the steamers and the railroads is a moot point,
as we shall see. The data on the navigation season's being open or
closed will be used to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
Finally, there are potentially important data which have proved
impossible to locate. Three continuous series of dummy variables on
trouble in contiguous eastbound pools, in the westbound pool, and in
the other two commodity pools from Chicago would have been useful in
attempting to explain the variation in the dependent variable. Only a
partial series for any of these was available, so the impact of these
forces could not be tested.
The model which was specified for estimation was a logistic func-
tion, as in equation (6) above,
PA = L(X'y) = [1 + exp(-X'Y)]
-1
where PA is equal to 1 if there were no reports of cheating in any of
the four contemporary journals and to otherwise. The vector of inde-
pendent variables is described in the notes to Table 3.
For purposes of interpreting the results the partials of PA with
respect to the independent variables must be specified.
1PA
, exp(X'Y)
3Xi 1 [1 + exp(X'Y)] 2
Therefore,
3PA > n > n
^XT< ° as Yi < °
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The sign on the estimated parameters of the logistic function will there-
fore indicate whether changes in variable X., ceteris paribus
,
increase
or decrease the probability of adherence to the representative contract
in the Chicago Eastbound Dead Freight Pool.
The first five independent variables are included to test the in-
fluence on cartel stability of overruns and shortfalls in each member's
allotment. It should be noted, a point previous investigators have over-
looked, that it is not a foregone conclusion that deviations were a sign
of malfunction in the cartel. Indeed they could have been caused by
the transfer of freight from roads over to roads under in settlement of
,
18
accounts.
X,—the total tonnage of dead freight shipped east by the cartel in
the period (tl)is meant to capture the effect of fluctuations in the
demand for transport services on cartel adherence. I have argued that
a cartel was more likely to remain stable when business was good and
more likely to break up when business was declining. This suggests
that the estimated coefficient for this variable, y, . should have a
b
positive sign. It should further be noted that the correlation between
flour and grain tonnage and total dead freight tonnage was very high.
That is, flour and grain shipments made up the bulk of the total market
demand for the cartel's services. The percentage of total dead freight
tonnage accounted for by this subset was less than 75% of all tons
shipped east for only a few weeks in the sample period and averaged
1984% of dead freight tonnage shipped east ror the 328-week period.
The interaction term, X.,, isolates the specific effect on cartel
i
stabilitv of large shortfalls in market shares. If non-adherence in the
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cartel was reported during the previous week, the interaction term dis-
appears. However, if the cartel was working well in the preceding week,
then this variable appears as simply the total tons under allotments.
This does not necessarily imply that roads short are thought to have
always started rate wars. The hypothesis would simply be that the
larger the shortfall, ceteris paribus , the less likely would be adherence.
Thus, it should be the case that y ? < C. The reader should note that
5
Z X.
X
7
=
PVl^ ] '
Given this, the variable is really measuring the effect on cartel adher-
ence for large deviations from all allotments, not just deficits, when
reports of cheating have already been received. There will therefore,
be a strong correlation between X
7
and the first five independent var-
iables.
Variable X„ tests the hypothesis that the presence and absence
of competition from Great Lakes' vessels had an effect on the probability
of adherence to the cartel by the railroad members. The contention in
earlier work was that the cartel became less stable when the lakes
20
closed. There are reasons for doubting this influence. First, there
were reports of joint-ownership of rail and steamer lines; and second,
some cartel members benefitted whether dead freight was received at
Chicago or at Buffalo and thus would not be much disturbed by the ac-
tivities of the lake vessels. Which of these hypotheses regarding
inter-modal competition is believable can be resolved by observing the
sign and significance of XQ . The variable has been valued such that it
o
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is equal to 1 when the lakes are open and to U otherwise. Thus, if the
beginning of the navigation system adversely effected the probability
of cartel adherence, then the coefficient on X. should be less than zero.
o
A large and significant positive value for the estimated coefficient
would be difficult to explain. The smaller the value of the parameter,
if it is positive, the more comfortable one would feel about accepting
the hypothesis that the presence of lake competition had no effect on
cartel stability. The historical evidence would then support the con-
tention that the only effect which the lake vessels had with regard to
the rail collusion was on the level of rates. Typically when the lakes
closed in December or November the cartel, in concert, raised the tariff
of rates 5c/100 lbs. of grain. When the ice broke up around the Straits
of Mackinac in the spring, the cartel commissioner would announce that
all the roads would lower their tariff 5c.
X
q
— the sum of all deviations, over and under allotments for
period (tl) , weighted by the mean tonnage of flour and grain shipped by
the cartel over the past month—attempts to get at the effect on cartel
adherence of deviations, given changes in the transferable subset of
dead freight passing through Chicago. Not all of the dead freight ton-
nage eastbound for the coast from the Midwest could be diverted among
the pool roads so as to equalize actual and allotted market shares. In
fact the only freight which could satisfy this requirement was flour
and grain for export to Europe. It did not much matter through which
port between Baltimore and Boston the grain and flour passed; the dif-
ferentials from Chicago to the various cities had been established such
that—among other reasons— the export rate (the combined domestic rail/
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trans-Atlantic ccean shipping rate from Chicago to Liverpool) would be
equal no matter the route. The figures available from the Railway Review
and the Chicago Tribune do not distinguish between through shipments of
cereal grain and flour for export and for domestic destinations. Weekly
grain expert statistics did appear in the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle , but they were sporadic rather than continuous, and, worse,
they gave exports by port but not by point of origin of the shipment.
In view of these difficulties, it seemed reasonable to use total flour
and grain shipments of the Chicago cartel as the simple proxy for the
transf errable subset of all dead freight. The implicit assumption is
that flour and grain tons marked for export were proportional to all
21
through tonnage of those commodities. A road short may be assumed to
have gauged the likelihood of receiving transfers from roads over from
the size of the transferrable subset of dead freight. Conversely, for
roads over, the ease of discharging their transfers to deficit roads
would be easier, the larger the volume of flour and grain shipments
eastbound to the coast. These considerations suggest that the probabil-
ity of adherence should vary inversely with respect to XQ . That is, the
larger the tonnage of the transf errable subset relative to the inter-
road tonnage obligations, the smaller will be Xq , and the smaller
would be the probability of the offering of a discount on the represen-
tative contract. yq should be < 0.
The results of two regressions are given in Table 3 as equations
1 and 2. The second regression is simply the first equation with the
statistically insignificant variables omitted. The last four estimators
in the first regression are significant, and all save the navigation
-19-
season dunnny have the anticipated sign for the estimated parameter.
For the lakes dummy variable the indication is that the opening of the
navigation season on the Great Lakes reduced the probability of adher-
ence to the cartel but that the effect was very weak. None of the
first five variables is statistically significant, even given the large
number of degrees of freedom. The signs of the coefficients on those
terms are also ambiguous. The Durbin-Watson statistic reveals no sig-
nificant autocorrelation in the error term. Taken together these nine
variables explained over 90% of the variance in adherence to the rates
of the Chicago eastbound dead freight pool between January 1, 1880, and
April 13, 1886.
The results of the second regression are stronger. The estimated
values of the coefficients were remarkably stable when the other vari-
ables were dropped. Again there is non-significant autocorrelation, and
these two variables alone account for 89.3% of the variance in the adher-
2
ence measure, a trivially lower R from the previous regression. The
signs on the estimators are once more compatible with a priori expecta-
tions.
These regressions suggest very strongly that periods of railroad
cartel stability and instability before the passage of the Act to Regu-
late Commerce can be adequately explained. The crucial factors in caus-
ing the probability of adherence to fall were a drop in the total tonnage
presented to the cartel for shipment east and an increase in deviations
from allotments relative to the volume of flour and grain shipments.
When this freight available for diversion in settlement of inter-firm
accounts fell at the same time as, for whatever reason, the deviations
-20-
betveen actual tens carried and tons alloted under the cartel contract
grew larger, the chances of the collusion's holding together fell es-
pecially dramatically. Lastly, if the cartel rates were already being
shaded, then a large volume of tons under allotments caused conditions
to worsen, as indicated bv the coefficient on X...
' ' 7
IV.
The research reported here indicates that internal policing mech-
anisms adopted by a cartel are capable of leading to intermittent cartel
success. That is, it is not necessarily true that enforcement of the
cartel contract must be external to the collusion to be effective. But
it is further evident from the behavior of the late nineteenth century
railroad cartels that internall-achieved collusive success fluctuates
with the demand for cartel output. It would be a step forward if this
hypothesis could be tested for cartels which have operated with external
enforcement (e.g., the government enforced the collusive contract) and
under the added pressure of avoiding dectection by the antitrust author-
ities. Behavior under those circumstances should net be significantly
different from that reported here.
Additionally, the research here reported implicitly questions the
widely-held belief that the first federal regulatory agency, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (1887), was necessary for the railroads to
achieve joint-maximum profits. Further research must now establish
whether the record of the railroad cartels was significantly different
after 1887 and if so, whether that difference was due to the regulatory
agency's acting as a cartel manager or to a coincidental boom in the
demand for rail freight service.
-21-
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,
September 28, I860, p. 446: the Fort Wayne
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,
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The Chicago and Grand Trunk, a Canadian road, was the prime
culprit here. The source of dissatisfaction was that the Grand Trunk
believed that its allotment in the livestock cartel was too low.
Arbitrators agreed and the trouble ended.
11
Daniel Orr and Paul W. MacAvoy, Price Strategies to Promote
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205-18.
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Railway Review , September 8, 1883, and Fink's letter to the New
York Tribune reproduced on page 531 of that same issue of the Railway
Review.
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See the discussion in section III.
14
Further institutional reasons for concentrating on flour and grain
volume as indicators of relevant business for studying this cartel's
health is given in section III.
See the discussion in section III on these reports.
See T. S. Ulen, "Cyclical Factors in Cartel Stability: Theory,"
Faculty Working Paper; University cf Illinois, March, 1979.
MacAvoy, op. cit
.
, supra n. 1, had suggested that the lake
steamer lines and the railroads were competitors, and that the rail
cartel often suffered breakdowns during the spring, summer, and fall
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the lake navigation season.
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chapter 2.
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In an earlier regression X, covered only flour and grain and
the resulting coefficient was not much different from that reported be-
low. Flour and grain tons transported by the cartel now enters into
variable X
q
in the current regression in a far more defensible manner.
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MacAvoy, passim ; especially p. 195, n. 3.
21
Ibid
.
,
p. 19d, n. 3. "Demand for the transport of grain for
export was an important part of total demand. The statistical Append!:;
to Chapter 6, p. 2b5, indicates that exports were smaller, and the de-
clared value of experts smaller, in 1581-1882 than in t.ie previous
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year—so that demand for export-grain transport had fallen in this year
of cartel breakdown. This is true of 1883-1884 as well, but not of
1884-1885; and grain exports in 1886-1887, another disastrous year for
the cartel, were the largest of the decade. Demand for the transport
of export-grain appears to have greatly declined in 1887-1888, but there
was no disloyalty to the agreement this first year of regulation. In
the 1390 's, demand declined in the 1893 to 1895 period, as did the suc-
cess of the cartel; demand increased from 1896 to 1898, while the cartel
continued to be ineffective." Actually the correlation is somewhat
better than this excerpt indicates. 1886-1887 was not a "disastrous year
for the cartel." Two new roads were invited in: an older member, the
Chicago and Atlantic came back in; and the grain rate was raised to
30C/100 lbs. of grain, the highest level in nearly 18 months. Moreover,
1884 and 1885 were years not much different from 1881 (see Table 2,
col. (5)), which MacAvoy identified as one of breakdown. Finally, the
contention that 1886-1887 was a year of the largest grain shipments of
the decade is not quite correct. The following table gives total ex-
ports of flour, wheat, corn, and rye from the United States to Europe
for the period 1880-1896.
Additionally, taking export grain as the relevant measure of the
demand for cartel output is incorrect. Variable X accomplishes that.
Variable X
c incorporates export grain shipments (through a proportional
proxy, total tons of flour and grain shipped east) as the transf errable
subset for equalizing actual and allotted tons.
M/D/208
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Table 1
Annual Shipments and Freight Revenues, 1873-1896
(1)
Total Flour
Year and Grain Shipments
from Chicago
bu.
(2)
Freight
Revenue
,
13 U.S. Roads
$1000
(3)
Annual %
Change in
Flour & Grain
Shipments
(4)
Annual %
Change in
Freight
Revenues-
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
91 ,597,
84 ,020,
72 ,369,
87 ,241,
90 ,706,
118 ,675,
125 ,528,
154 ,377,
140 .307,
114 ,864,
141 ,720,
138 ,652,
135 ,587,
129 ,636,
151 ,658,
156 ,659,
179 ,035,
204 ,674,
207 ,987,
216 ,182,
198 ,791,
148 638,
171 464,
219 ,710,
,092
,691
,174
,306
,076
,469
,379
,115
,597
,933
,259
,155
,921
,678
,224
,986
,997
,918
,762
,008
,216
,822
,137
,781
389.036
379,467
363,960
361,137
347,705
365,466
386,676
467,749
551,968
485,778
539,510
502,870
509.691
550,35 9
636,666
639,201
665,962
734,822
- 8.27
- 13.87
+ 20.55
+ 3.97
+ 30.84
+ 5.77
+ 22.98
- 9.11
- 18.13
+ 23.38
- 2.16
- 2.21
- 4.39
+ 16.99
+ 3.30
+ 14.28
+ 14.32
+ 1.62
+ 3.94
- 8.04
- 25.23
+ 15.36
+ 28.14
- 2,
- 4,
- 0,
- 0,
+ 5,
+ 5,
+ 20.
+ 18.
- 11.
+ 11,
- 6.
+ 1.
+ 7.
+ 15,
+ 0.
+ 4.
+ 10.
09
78*
37*
11
80
97
01*
99
06
79
36*
98*
68
40
19
34
Sources
:
Col. (1): Chicago 3oard of Trade, Annual Report , v. 39 (1896), p. 20.
Col. (2): U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1957 , Series Q-27, p. 42S. The
data are originally from the various annual issues of Poor's Manual
of the Railroads of the U.S. and cover the freight revenues of the
following 13 roads: the Pennsylvania; the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne &
Chicago; the New York Central; the Lake Shore; the Michigan Central;
the Boston & Albany; the New York, Lake Erie & Western; the Illinois
Central; the Chicago & Alton; the Chicago & Rock Island; the Chica-
go, 3urlington & Quincy; the Chicago & Northwestern; and the Chica-
go, Milwaukee & St. Paul.'
Col. (3): Calculated from column 1.
Col. (4) : Calculated from column 2.
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Table 2
Determinants of Revenue Changes for Chicago Roads, 1873--1896
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Annual % Annual % Total miles Index Avg. Grain
Year
Change in
Flour & Grain
Change in
Freight
of railroad
construction
of
Cartel
rate
to :
,
Chicago
Mew York,
Shipments Revenues in US Adherence C per 100 lbs.
1873 ___ ___ 4,097 ___ , _
1874 - 8.27 - 2.46 2,117
1875 - 13.87 - 4.09 1,711
1876 + 20.55 - 0.78* 2,712
1877 + 3.97 - 0.37* 2,280
1878 + 30.84 + 5.11 2,679
1879 + 5.77 + 5.80 4,817
1880 + 22.98 + 20.97 6,712 1 32.71
1881 - 9.11 + 18.01* 9,847 .33 24.20
1882 - 18.13 - 11.99 11,569 • .94 24.04
1883 + 23.38 + 11.06 6,743 .90 26.88
1884 - 2.16 + 6.79* 3,924 .42 22.60
1885 - 2.21 + 1.36* 2,982 .23 21.35
1886 - 4.39 + 7.98* 8,012 .50a 25.42
1887 + 16.99 + 15.68 12,878
1888 + 3.30 + 0.40 6,912
1889 + 14.23 + 4.19 5,184
1890 + 14.32 + 10.34 5,337
1891 + 1.62 4,072
1892 + 3.94 4,426
1893 - 8,04 2,277
1894 - 25.23 1,927
1895 + 15.36 1,520
1896 + 28.14 1,688
Sources and Notes:
a. The entry covers only January 1 - April 18, 1886, after which time
continuous records were not available.
Cols. (1) and (2): See Table 14, Sources.
Col. (3): Chicago Board of Trade, Annual Report v. 39 (1896) as de-
rived from the annual issues of Poor's Manual of the Railroads of
the United States and annually revised.
Col. (4) : Reports of adherence to the cartel rate were derived from
Railway Review
,
the Chicago Tribune , 3radstreet '
s
,
and Railroad
Gazette . If any of the four sources reported cheating in a given
weekly edition, it was assumed that cheating occurred during that
week. The number of weeks during which no reports of non-adherence
were recorded was divided into the number of weeks in the calendar
year to derive the given index.
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Col. (5): Chicago Board of Trade, Annual Reports , v. 23-29
(1880 - 1886) and Railway Review , 1880 - 1S86; Chicago Tribune
,
1880 — 1886. The averages shown are derived from actual rather
than officially quoted rates. The average was derived as a
weighted average, the weights being the percentage of total weeks
of the calendar year during which each rate held.
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Sources and Notes to Figure 1:
(1) Total miles constructed in the United States, 1873-1896: Chicago
Board of Trade, Annual Report , v. 39 (1896) as taken from the
annual issues of Poor's Manuals and annuallv revised.
(2) The NBER re
J. Schwartz,
Princeton:
of Economic
expansion:
contraction
:
expansion:
contraction
expansion:
contraction:
expansion:
contraction:
expansion:
contraction:
expansion:
contraction:
ference cycle chronology: Milton Friedman and Anna
. A Monetary History of the United States
,
Princeton University Press for the National Bureau
Research,
4th qtr.
4th qtr.
2nd qtr.
2nd qtr.
3rd qtr.
2nd qtr.
2nd qtr.
3rd qtr.
3rd qtr.
1st qtr.
3rd qtr.
1st qtr.
The actual phases are as follows
1870 - 3rd qtr.
1873 - 1st qtr.
1879 - 1st qtr.
1882 - 2nd qtr.
1884 - 1st qtr.
1887 - 1st qtr.
1888 - 2nd qtr.
1890 - 2nd qtr.
1891 - 4th qtr.
1893 - 2nd qtr.
1894 - 4th qtr.
1896 - 2nd qtr.
1873.
1879.
1882.
1884.
1887.
1888.
1890.
1891.
1892.
1894.
1895.
1897.
(3) Flour and grain shipments from Chicago:
Annual Report , v. 39 (1896)
.
Chicago Board of Trade,
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Notes to Table 3:
a. The independent variables are as follows:
X = the proportional deviation between allotted and actual tonnage in the
preceding week for the New York Central affiliates (the Lake Shore,
the Michigan Central, and the Nickel Plate),
= ABS (NYCAL • CARTELT - NYCTT ) / NYCAL • CARTELT
where
NYCAL = the percentage of dead freight allotted to the New York Central
affiliates in the most recent cartel contract.
CARTELT = the total tons of dead freight shipped by all members of the
cartel in week t.
NYCTT = the actual number of tons carried by the New York Central
affiliates in week t.
X„ = similarly for the Pennsylvania Railroad's 'affiliates (the Ft. Wayne
and the Pan Handle)
,
X_ = similarly for the Chicago and Grand Trunk,
X, = Similarly for the Chicago and Atlantic,
Xj. = similarly for the Baltimore and Ohio,
X, = the total tonnage shipped east by the cartel in the previous period
(t-1)
,
X
7
= an interaction term: the state of the cartel in the preceding week
times the total number of tons below allotments in the entire cartel
in the previous period,
X„ = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lakes were open and to if they
were closed,
X_ = the sum of all deviations in tonnage in period (t-1) divided by the
mean tonnage of flour and grain shipped by the cartel over the past
month.
For the regressions the specification was that the dependent variable was
binary, equal to 1 if adherence. was reported to the cartel rates and to
if non-adherence was reported. The independent variables were expressed
in the logistic function, viz.,
L(X'Y) = [1 + exp(-X'Y)]" 1
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As noted in the text,
5PA exp (-X'Y)
dX. f ± [1 + exp(-X'6)] 2 *
1
-m. 3PA > _Thus , -r=- =0 as Y . = .
1
Since for non-linear estimation of the logistic function with a binary
dependent variable, ~ may not be homoskedastic, o - was graphed against
u u
each of the independent variables. In no instance was a systematic rela-
tionship discovered; thus, the assumption was that there was no hetero-
skedasticity.
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